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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, Marvin Tomas-Velasquez was convicted of one count of felony
trafficking in methamphetamine, one count of misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and one
count of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia.
Mr. Tomas-Velasquez asserts that the district court erred by admitting evidence and
testimony at trial after the court ruled prior to trial that the evidence and testimony was
inadmissible due to the late disclosure of the scope of the State's expert's testimony.
Mr. Tomas-Velasquez further contends the evidence was insufficient to establish either
constructive or actual possession of the marijuana and the drug paraphernalia.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On the evening of December 24, 2018, the car Mr. Tomas-Velasquez was driving with
his ex-wife, Ashley Tomas-Velasquez, riding as his passenger was stopped by law enforcement
for an equipment violation.

(Trial Tr., p.163, L.11 - p.164, L.12.)

Ashley testified that

Mr. Tomas-Velasquez placed a small bag containing methamphetamine behind her leg after he
saw the emergency lights of the police car. (Trial Tr., p.373, Ls.4-16; State's Exh. 5.) The
controlled substance was visible to the officer, after he made contact with the occupants of the
vehicle. (Trial Tr., p.168, Ls.7-11.) The driver and passenger were removed from the vehicle,
and a search of the vehicle ensued. (Trial Tr., p.169, L.17 - p.171, L.23.) Two more baggies
containing a crystalline substance testing presumptively positive for methamphetamine were
located between the driver's and passenger's seats, squeezed under the passenger's seat cushion.
(Trial Tr., p.174, L.7 - p.175, L.22; p.376, Ls.2-4.) The baggies "were squeezed between the
center seat of the driver on the right edge and the passenger's left edge of the cushion, and down
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in between the cushion." (Trial Tr., p.174, Ls.7-15.) The total weight of the methamphetamine
found in the car was 3.92 ounces. (Trial Tr., p.303, L.14 - p.305, L.10.) A small, gold canister
containing marijuana was located in the glove box. (Trial Tr., p.171, L.25 - p.172, L.11.) A
brown smoking pipe that smelled of burnt marijuana was located underneath the center armrest.
(Trial Tr., p.173, L.14-p.174, L.1.)
When Mr. Tomas-Velasquez was booked into jail, he had two phones in his belongings.
(Trial Tr., p.223, Ls.22-24.) One was an iPhone, the other, an LG phone with a broken screen.
(Trial Tr., p.223, L.22 - p.224, L.2.) Ashley Tomas-Velasquez made a phone call while in jail.
(Trial Tr., p.288, L.14 - p.290, L.19.)

She correctly told the person that four ounces of

methamphetamine were found in the car, despite having never been shown or told by law
enforcement what quantity of methamphetamine was recovered. (Trial Tr., p.241, L.2 - p.242,
L.20; State's Exh. 12.)
Based on these facts, the State filed an Information alleging Mr. Tomas-Velasquez
committed the crimes of trafficking in methamphetamine by possessing 28 grams of more,
misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia.
(R., pp.29-30.) In Ada County case CR0l-18-60502, Ashley Tomas-Velasquez was charged by
Information with trafficking in methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.133, L.6 - p.134, L.14.) The
cases of the ex-spouses were consolidated. (R., p.14.)
Prior to trial, Mr. Tomas-Velasquez objected to the late-filed disclosure of the scope of
the State's expert witness's testimony. (7/2/19 Tr., p.6, L.17 - p.7, L.14.) The district court
ruled that the late-disclosed testimony of the State's witness, Officer Jordan McCarthy, would
not be admissible. (7/2/19 Tr., p.22, Ls.6-14.) On the first day of trial, Officer McCarthy was
asked on direct examination about the cost of methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.313, Ls.23-25.)
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Defense counsel objected and reminded the court of its prior ruling excluding such evidence and
testimony due to the State's late disclosure of the subject matter of this witness's testimony.
(Trial Tr., p.314, L.1 - p.318, L.12.)

The district court ultimately overruled Mr. Tomas-

Velasquez's objection. (Trial Tr., p.321, L.23.)
A series of text messages, a photograph, and phone records extracted from the LG phone
were admitted at trial. (Trial Tr., p.326, Ls.11-12; p.335, L.18 - p.337, L.10; p.342, Ls.2-8;
p.345, Ls.19-25.) The messages were in Spanish, but contained references to what appeared to
be weights and the word "Walmart." (Trial Tr., p.329, Ls.9-20; State's Exhs. 9, 15.) In addition
to the text messages, a photograph of what appeared to be methamphetamine was taken by the
phone on December 18, 2018. (State's Exh. 6.)
Mr. Tomas-Velasquez was found guilty as charged. (Trial Tr., p.7, Ls.1-12; R., p.112.)
At sentencing, the State recommended a sentence of twenty years, with ten years fixed. (10/1/19
Tr., p.10, Ls.17-24.) The defense recommended three years fixed. (10/1/19 Tr., p.12, L.22 p.13, L.2.) The district court sentenced Mr. Tomas-Velasquez to a unified term of eight fixed
years on the felony. (10/1/19 Tr., p.18, Ls.6-11; R., pp.117-21.) Mr. Tomas-Velasquez filed a
Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's judgment of conviction. 1 (R., pp.125-28.)
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Mr. Tomas-Velasquez filed a timely motion for reconsideration pursuant to I.C.R. 35(b ).
(R., p.131.) The district court denied the motion, finding that Mr. Tomas-Velasquez did not
submit new or additional information in support of his motion. (R., pp.147-51.)
3

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by admitting evidence it had previously ruled inadmissible for
failure to comply with expert witness disclosure requirements under I.C.R. 16?

II.

Was there sufficient evidence that Mr. Tomas-Velasquez possessed marijuana and drug
paraphernalia?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Permitting The Prosecutor To Question Officer McCarthy Regarding
Average Methamphetamine Prices, Where The Court Ruled Prior To Trial That Such Testimony
Was Inadmissible

A.

Introduction
At trial, the district court permitted the prosecutor to question Officer McCarthy, a State's

expert witness, regarding the average price for methamphetamine in December of 2018, despite
the fact that the prosecutor did not disclose this anticipated testimony to the defense until shortly
before trial-more than a month after the court's discovery deadline had passed. Although the
district court excluded such testimony in a pre-trial ruling, at trial the court misremembered its
decision and permitted the officer to testify to the average price of the substance, to the detriment
of Mr. Tomas-Velasquez's defense. By admitting the testimony, the district court abused its
discretion by failing to act consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it and by failing to reach its decision by the exercise of reason.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence at trial and its judgment

will be reversed only where there is an abuse of that discretion." State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241,
250 (2008) (citations omitted). The trial court also has discretion to determine the appropriate
sanction for a discovery violation. State v. Wilson, 158 Idaho 585, 588 (Ct. App. 2015). When
this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court, it must consider "[w ]hether the
trial court:

(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer

boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
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specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason."
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018) (citation omitted).

Once a defendant appealing from an objected-to error has shown that the error occurred,
"the State shall have the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010). "To meet that burden, the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained." State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 11 (2013).
To say that an error did not "contribute" to the ensuing verdict is not, of course, to
say that the jury was totally unaware of that feature of the trial later held to have
been erroneous .... To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is, rather,
to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on
the issue in question, as revealed in the record.
Id. (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991), overruled in part on other grounds by
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n.4 (1991)). "Thus, an appellate court's inquiry 'is not

whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been
rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to
the error."' Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)) (emphasis in original).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Permitted The Prosecutor To Question Detective
McCarthy About The Price Of Methamphetamine, Where The Court Had Previously
Ruled Such Testimony Inadmissible For Failure To Comply With I.C.R. 16
Prior to trial, defense counsel brought it to the court's attention that the State had

disclosed, after the pretrial conference, a report from a proposed expert-a narcotics officer.
(7/2/19 Tr., p.6, Ls.17-19.) Defense counsel summarized the substance of the report disclosed by
the prosecution:
That report seems to indicate that he would - the proposed testimony is the street
value of methamphetamine, and the reason that the state believes it's relevant is
that they intend to introduce a series of text messages that are purportedly
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between Mr. Tomas-Velasquez and a third party where there is some discussion
of exchanging, presumably, drugs for certain dollar amounts.
(7/2/19 Tr., p.6, L.19 - p.7, L.14.) Defense counsel said that she had looked into whether the
expert's proposed testimony could be challenged if the defense were to retain their own expert
and had concluded that the expert's testimony certainly could be challenged. (7/2/19 Tr., p.7,
Ls.4-9.) As of the July 2, 2019 hearing, the case was set for trial to begin on July 10, 2019.
(7/2/19 Tr., p.12, Ls.14-16; R., p.48.) The prosecutor explained why its additional disclosure
was late-he had recently reviewed a decision regarding the insufficiency of an expert witness
disclosure, and he wanted to provide further information that had not been provided in his initial
disclosure. (7/2/19 Tr., p.7, L.15 - p.9, L.24.) He clarified the additional disclosure was filed on
June 16, 2019. (7/2/19 Tr., p.9, Ls.13-19.) He asked the district court to continue the case.
(7/2/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.11-13.)
The district court read the requirements ofl.C.R. 16(7) and concluded:
Here, it appears the state wants to introduce an opinion by this police officer
about the street price of methamphetamine in various quantities in some
time frame, I'd imagine, close to when this occurred.
From what [the prosecutor] just told me, that was not in, well, other than
mentioning that he'd talk about prices, what prices were, what the facts or data
he's relying on to form the opinion about what the prices were, is not contained in
the state's initial disclosure. It sounds like the state's initial disclosure was two
weeks after my cutoff for compliance with discovery in any event.
I'll find that the state's disclosure is both untimely and inadequate. I'll exclude
that testimony from trial.
(7/2/19 Tr., p.11, Ls.2-17.)

The district court's order reflected the discovery deadline was

May 10, 2019. (R., pp.33-35.)
The district court denied the State's motion for a continuance, and ruled as follows:
Well, I'm not going to move the trial date. I'm going to exclude the state's
expert. Frankly this simply should have been done on time. It should have been
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done better than it was. It sounds to me like the state has other avenues by which
it can attempt to prove this case. I'll simply leave it to lie in the bed that it made.
I'll keep this on for trial.
(7/2/19 Tr., p.22, Ls.6-14.)

The district court repeated, "I'm not going to exclude the text

messages themselves. I'm simply excluding the expert testimony." (7/2/19 Tr., p.23, Ls.2-4.)
The prosecutor said he did not think he would be able to match the weights and prices of
methamphetamine to the text messages he sought to admit from December 14 to December 22
(7/2/19 Tr., p.25, Ls.3-13.)

The prosecutor then asked the court about a photograph of

methamphetamine found on the LG phone taken six days before the incident, and the admission
of text messages sent and received by Mr. Tomas-Velasquez's phone. (7/2/19 Tr., p.23, L.24 p.26, L.10.) The district court ruled that such evidence would not be excluded on I.R.E. 403
grounds. (7/2/19 Tr., p.28, L.5 - p.31, L.7.)
At trial, the prosecutor called Officer McCarthy, and began asking him about
methamphetamine amounts. (Trial Tr., p.313, Ls.12-22.) When the prosecutor asked Officer
McCarthy about the price of an ounce of methamphetamine in December of 2018, defense
counsel objected. (Trial Tr., p.313, L.23 - p.314, L.3.) Outside the presence of the jury, the
prosecutor clarified his understanding of the district court's ruling on his motion in limine:
I believe that your ruling was that he was excluded as an expert and he could not
bring an opinion pursuant to our disclosure that the text messages found on the
phone were that of drug transactions. I'm asking him simply factual questions of
what, in his training and experience, that sold for on a particular date. That
requires no expert opinion under the rules of evidence.
(Trial Tr., p.314, 1.20 - p.315, L.2.) The district court determined that the information was
within the purview of I.R.E. 702 and held, "Here I think the State's initial disclosure was an
adequate one to put the defense on notice that Detective McCarthy would be answering the
question that he just got asked. And so I'll overrule the objection." (Trial Tr., p.316, Ls.7-11.)
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After defense counsel reminded the court that, in the second expert witness disclosure in
which the State disclosed that Officer McCarthy would be testifying about how much an ounce
of methamphetamine sells for, the court "ruled that the State could not elicit testimony about that
specific pricing because that specific pricing was lacking in their initial expert disclosure."
(Trial Tr., p.317, Ls.15-24.)
The district court ruled:
Well, I apologize if there was some imprecision in my pretrial ruling. My
recollection of my ruling was I would not permit Detective McCarthy to give an
opinion about the particular text messages that, I guess are going to be offered
into evidence at some point in this case. I would not permit him to give an
opinion about whether he believed these two individuals, or either one of them,
was engaged in the sale of narcotics based on what he read on the phone. I would
[not] permit him to give an opinion that the text messages are talking about drugs.

I do believe the State's disclosure that they were going to ask him questions,
given his specialized knowledge as a police officer, about price and how drugs are
sold was adequate and was timely made. And so I'll permit him to answer the
question that was asked.
(Trial Tr., p.318, L.23 - p.319, L.24.) Thereafter, Officer McCarthy testified that one ounce of
methamphetamine could be sold for between $300-$600 in December of 2018. (Trial Tr., p.322,
Ls.3-10.)
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by know ledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if that person's
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
I.R.E. 702. Idaho Criminal Rule 16 defines the discovery and disclosure obligations of the
prosecution in a criminal case. Rule 16(b)(7) states, in relevant part:
Upon written request of the defendant the prosecutor shall provide a written
summary or report of any testimony that the state intends to introduce pursuant to
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Rules 702, 703 or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence at trial or hearing. The
summary provided must describe the witness's opinions, the facts and data for
those opinions, and the witness's qualifications.
I.C.R. 16(b)(7). The purpose of I.C.R. 16 is to promote fairness and candor and to prevent
surprise at trial. See State v. Morin, 158 Idaho 622, 626 (Ct. App. 2015).
"The choice of an appropriate sanction, or whether to impose a sanction at all, for a
party's failure to comply with a discovery request or order is within the discretion of the trial
court." State v. Wilson, 158 Idaho 585, 588 (Ct. App. 2015). A trial court's failure to analyze
whether a party would suffer prejudice due to late disclosure constitutes an abuse of discretion.
State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 634 (1997).
Thus, the State was required to fully disclose the extent of the expert's opinions. As the
district court held, it failed to do so here. "[W]hat the facts or data he's relying on to form the
opinion about what the prices were, is not contained in the state's initial disclosure." (7/2/19
Tr., p.11, Ls.7-12.)

The district court (initially) correctly excluded Officer McCarthy's

testimony regarding the price for methamphetamine in December of 2018, as a sanction for the
State's late disclosure.
Mr. Tomas-Velasquez's defense was surprised by the district court's sudden about face.
Defense counsel had no notice that the district court, who had clearly prohibited testimony from
Officer McCarthy on the prices for various weights of methamphetamine before trial, would
suddenly reverse its decision in the middle of trial. This reversal was to the defense's detriment
and hampered his ability to meet the evidence at trial as the defense no longer had time to
arrange for testimony to refute this new subject matter. Further, the jurors could now link the
numbers in the text messages to their discussion of weight, as the prosecutor argued in his
closing statement. (See State's Exh. 15; Trial Tr., p.459, Ls.5-11.) The testimony brought

meaning to the content of the text messages retrieved from the LG phone in Mr. TomasVelasquez's possession, and thereby harmed his defense.
Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it acted inconsistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it and surprised the defense by allowing
the officer to testify about the average price of methamphetamine in December of 2018. The
State will be unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court's error in admitting
the evidence is harmless.

II.
The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That
Mr. Tomas-Velasquez Possessed The Marijuana And Pipe

A.

Introduction
The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. Tomas-Velasquez had actual or

constructive possession of the small, gold canister containing marijuana found in the glove box
(Trial Tr., p.171, L.25 - p.172, L.11; State's Exh. 13), or the brown smoking pipe found
underneath the center armrest (Trial Tr., p.173, L.14 - p.174, L.1). Specifically, the State failed
to prove Mr. Tomas-Velasquez knowingly possessed both the marijuana and the pipe.

B.

Standard Of Review
In State v. Southwick, 158 Idaho 173 (Ct. App. 2014), the Court of Appeals outlined the

appellate standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence:
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A finding
of guilt will not be overturned on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon
which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its
burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct.App.1998);
State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct.App.1991). We will
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not substitute our view for that of the trier of fact as to the credibility of the
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences
to be drawn from the evidence. Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001;
State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684, 701 P.2d 303, 304 (Ct.App.1985). Moreover,
we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho at 385, 957 P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104,
822 P .2d at 1001. Substantial evidence may exist even when the evidence
presented is solely circumstantial or when there is conflicting evidence. State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712, 215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009); State v. Stevens, 93
Idaho 48, 50-51, 454 P.2d 945, 947--48 (1969). In fact, even when circumstantial
evidence could be interpreted consistently with a finding of innocence, it will be
sufficient to uphold a guilty verdict when it also gives rise to reasonable
inferences of guilt. Severson, 147 Idaho at 712, 215 P.3d at 432; State v. Slawson,
124 Idaho 753, 757, 864 P.2d 199,203 (Ct.App.1993).
158 Idaho at 177-78.

C.

The Evidence Was Insufficient To Prove Possession Because The State Failed To Prove
Mr. Tomas-Velasquez Knowingly Possessed The Marijuana In The Glovebox And The
Pipe In The Armrest Console
To prove possession of a controlled substance, the State must show the act of possession

and "the knowledge that one is in possession of the substance." State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926
(1993). "Possession of a controlled substance may be actual or constructive. When the accused
is not in actual physical possession the State must show that he had such knowledge and control
of the substance as to establish constructive possession." State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 706
(Ct. App. 1994). Moreover, "[w]here joint occupancy is involved," "substantial evidence must
exist establishing the guilt of each defendant, not merely the collective guilt of both." State v.
Garza, 112 Idaho 778, 784 (Ct. App. 1987). "Proximity alone will not suffice as proof of

possession." Id. 112 Idaho at 784-85. "[C]onstructive possession exists where a nexus between
the accused and the controlled substance is sufficiently proven so as to give rise to the reasonable
inference that the accused was not simply a bystander but, rather, had the power and the intent to
exercise dominion or control over the marijuana." Id. 112 Idaho at 784.
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Here, the State failed to present any evidence Mr. Tomas-Velasquez had knowledge and
control over the marijuana canister found in the glovebox and the pipe found in the center
armrest console. In State v. Burnside, 115 Idaho 882 (Ct. App. 1989), the Court of Appeals had
to determine, inter alia, whether there was substantial evidence to support the jury's guilty
verdict on a charge of possession of psilocybin mushrooms with the intent to deliver. Id. at 885.
The case began when the police, armed with a warrant to search Burnside's car for evidence of
methamphetamine dealing, approached him and a passenger while they were eating in a
restaurant. Id. at 883. During the search of the car, the police discovered both methamphetamine
and psilocybin mushrooms. Id. Burnside was charged with, and convicted of, possession of
psilocybin mushrooms with intent to deliver and possession of methamphetamine. Id. at 883.
The Court of Appeals noted that, in order to prove that Burnside possessed the psilocybin
mushrooms, the State had to establish that he was "aware the mushrooms were in his car and that
he exercised dominion or control over them." Id. at 885. It noted that "the jury could not infer
constructive possession from the mere fact that Burnside occupied, with a passenger, the
automobile in which the drugs were seized." Id. (citing State v. Warden, 97 Idaho 752 (1976)).
The Court of Appeals explained that, "in order to prevail, the state had to offer evidence which
established that Burnside, individually, knew of the illegal drugs and that he exercised dominion
over them." Burnside, 115 Idaho at 885.
In concluding that the State had not met its burden, the Court of Appeals analyzed the
relevant facts:
The mushrooms were discovered in a black vinyl bag in Burnside's automobile.
When the police began their search of the car, Burnside told the officers that the
bag was not his. At trial, Burnside's passenger, Redd, repeatedly declared that he,
and not Burnside, owned the mushrooms. Evidence suggested that Burnside may
have sold the mushrooms to Redd, several hours earlier, in a motel room. The
mushrooms later were packaged for delivery. However, Redd claimed at trial,
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that he, and not Burnside, had packaged the mushrooms. When asked if he had
packaged the mushrooms for Burnside, Redd stated that he could not remember.
The evidence does not establish that Burnside exercised dominion and control
over the mushrooms, when in the car. The state failed to rebut Redd's claim of
sole ownership ... Burnside's remark to the police, that the black bag was not his,
suggests he probably knew the drugs were in his car. The motel sale also
indicates Burnside's knowledge. However, neither piece of evidence establishes
control. We find an absence of evidence on this element of the offense.
Id. at 885-86.

Because the pipe was found in the center console and the marijuana was found in the
glovebox and not in Mr. Tomas-Velasquez's actual possession, Idaho law required the State to
establish constructive possession-specifically, that Mr. Tomas-Velasquez knew of the
marijuana and the pipe and had the power and intention to control the items. State v. Blake, 133
Idaho 237, 242 (1999).
The State failed to establish Mr. Tomas-Velasquez had knowledge or control of the
marijuana in the glove compartment or the pipe in the center armrest console where the pipe was
equally accessible to the driver and the passenger, and the marijuana was more accessible to the
passenger. Neither the blood or urine of the driver or the passenger were tested. (Trial Tr. Vol
I., p.197, Ls.15-20.) Further, the metal canister containing the suspected marijuana was never
fingerprinted. (Trial Tr., p.200, Ls.20-25.) Officer Lane testified that he did not see any furtive
movements by the driver of the car when he stopped it. (Trial Tr., p.207, Ls.17-23.) Unlike the
facts in State v. Rogerson, 132 Idaho 53, 966 P.2d 53, 58-59 (Ct. App. 1998) (noting the fact that
the drugs and paraphernalia were found in the defendant's garage in plain view support a finding
the defendant knew of their existence), neither the marijuana nor the pipe were in plain view.
(See Trial Tr., p.171, L.25 - p.172, L.11; p.173, L.14 - p.174, L.1; State's Exh. 13.) Further,

there were two people who had been in the car, and the marijuana was nearer to Ashley Tomas-

14

Velasquez. 2 (Trial Tr., p.182, L.16 - p.185, L.15.) The State failed to establish that Mr. TomasVelasquez had knowledge of or control over the substance. Therefore, the State failed to present
sufficient evidence of Mr. Tomas-Velasquez's "power and intent to exercise dominion and
control" over the marijuana or the pipe. Southwick, 158 Idaho at 178.
Due to the insufficient evidence of possession of marijuana and paraphernalia, 3 the jury
verdict is invalid.

The insufficient evidence of possession requires that the judgment of

conviction be vacated as to the marijuana and paraphernalia convictions.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Tomas-Velasquez respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of
conviction and remand his case to the district court for a new trial on the trafficking count.
DATED this 29 th day of May, 2020.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

2

Ashley testified that the marijuana did not belong to her (Trial Tr., p.376, Ls.5-11), but she also
testified that the car did not belong to Mr. Tomas-Velasquez (Trial Tr., p.419, Ls.12-16).
3
Although Mr. Tomas-Velasquez was charged by Information with possession of paraphernalia
in the form of "baggies and/or a pipe" (R., p.30), at trial that theory appeared to be largely
abandoned. No baggies were admitted at trial as exhibits. (See R., pp.79-80.) The prosecutor
did not claim that Mr. Tomas-Velasquez separately possessed paraphernalia in the form of
"baggies." (Trial Tr., p.451, L.15 -p.468, L.16; p.483, L.25 - p.487, L.18.)
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